Euro pricing of crude oil : an OPEC's perspective by Samii, Massood et al.
Euro Pricing of Crude Oil: An OPEC's Perspective 
Samii, V. Massood  
Thirunavukkarasu, Arul  
Rajamanickam, Mohana  
Southern New Hampshire University 
 
Emails: m.samii@snhu.edu, a.thirunavukkarasu@snhu.edu, mona_simba@hotmail.com  
JEL Codes: F3, G1, Q3 
Key Words: Crude Oil, OPEC, Oil Prices and Euro 
Abstract 
In the late 1970s and the early part of the 1980s, a debate emerged within the Long Term 
Strategy Committee of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
whether to continue the pricing of crude oil in United States dollars or to shift to an 
alternative currency. This debate was rooted in the persistent decline in the value of the 
United States dollar relative to other global currencies. The choice of currencies available 
to price crude oil was limited for OPEC because of the inadequate liquidity of most other 
currencies. With the recent emergence of the euro, the issue of choice of currency for 
pricing crude oil has emerged once again for policy discussion. The current paper is 
focused on the implications of a shift in the pricing of crude oil from United States dollar 
to euro on OPEC members. Winners and losers are identified based on economic gains 
and losses. It is concluded that while such a policy would incrementally benefit OPEC en 
bloc, it would result in a disadvantage for the countries whose major trading partner is the 
United States and, therefore, would not be a Pareto optimal solution.  
  
I. Introduction 
In the late 1970s and the early part of the 1980s a debate within the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was whether to continue the pricing of crude oil 
in United States dollars or to shift to an alternative currency. This debate is rooted in the 
persistent decline in the value of the United States dollar relative to other global 
currencies such as the Japanese Yen and German Deutsche Mark. The core debate of 
OPEC's Long-Term Strategy Committee [1] was focused on the issue of oil price stability 
as well as maintaining the purchasing power of OPEC's oil revenues (Evans, 1986). This 
debate eventually led to the discussion of benchmarking oil prices to a basket of 
currencies to maintain the buying power of crude oil. The limited liquidity of other 
currencies was a major concern as it implied a shift to an alternative currency would lead 
to excessive fluctuations of the same.  
The emergence of the euro has opened the debate on this issue once again. Given the 
breadth of the exchange of euro, the number of countries using this currency, and the 
extent of trade relations of these countries with oil exporting countries, re-examination of 
the issue of currency choice in oil pricing has re-surfaced. Clearly there are positive as 
well as negative implications in the shift from United States dollar to euro in OPEC's 
pricing policy.  
Analysis of the shift in the pricing of oil from United States dollar to euro would require 
focusing on two groups of countries and two different markets. These four entities are: oil 
exporters (OPEC countries and non OPEC countries), oil consumers, oil market and the 
financial markets. Changes by any of the above four or new external shock 
(price/currency fluctuations) would affect the corners of the diamond in Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1 
  
Different levels of interactions are identified as illustrated in the Figure 1. In the 
innermost level, currency fluctuations affect the dollar prices of oil, which in turn alters 
the demand for oil which leads to the stability of the oil market. This instability in the oil 
market is transferred to the financial market by way of the changing demand and supply 
of dollars, which would again feed into the dynamics of the oil market. In the middle 
level, oil-exporting countries are added to the oil market-financial market loop because 
they react to the changes in the currency fluctuations in the financial market and alters the 
price of oil. In the outermost level, oil exporting countries and oil consuming countries 
interact with each other in their trading relationships. Various factors are affecting these 
three levels of interaction. In earlier research, the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on 
the oil market and the ability of OPEC to stabilize this market have been studied (Samii 
and Clemenz, 1988). The variation in the exchange rate is a destabilizing factor for the oil 
market. The current paper focuses on the interactions between the financial market and 
the oil market and proposes to determine the implications of a shift in the currency 
denomination of oil from United States dollar to euro only on OPEC members.  
  
II. Currency Dilemma 
  
OPEC sets their prices, as well as receives payments, in United States dollars. Between 
1971 and 1973, when the United States dollar faced trouble and devalued twice, the 
OPEC countries devised a formula to revise the nominal price of oil automatically. Since 
then, the issue of dollar devaluation leading to the loss of purchasing power of OPEC has 
been widely discussed (Allen, 1979). We have been witnessing a similar pattern of a 
declining dollar since February 2002, when the dollar depreciated by 19.3 percent against 
the Japanese yen, 28.8 percent against the euro, 18.6 percent against the UK pound, and 
25.4 percent against the Swiss franc. Any movement in the value of the dollar against 
other currencies will affect the real value of OPEC's export earnings. Because the United 
States dollar serves as the denominator for pricing crude oil, one can argue that due to 
differences in the individual country's trade direction and reserve composition, losses 
resulting from the dollar movements are not equal (Dailami, 1982). For those members 
who purchase a large share of its import needs from outside of the United States as well 
as for those that invest a large share of their reserves in United States dollar and dollar 
denominated assets, this loss is more evident.  
The choice of currency most favorable for oil pricing would be in realization of the 
following conditions. First, the main objective of currency selection should be to 
minimize the currency exposure, which translates to minimizing the gap between oil 
revenues and import expenses. Selection of a currency should be such that maintains its 
value over time vis-à-vis other major currencies. This implies a comparison of the price 
of a barrel of oil in United States dollars with that of the euro. For this purpose, we used a 
GDP weighted synthetic euro [2] exchange rate from DataStream until the emergence of 
the euro on January 1, 1999. One can argue that the oil prices should be based on the 
currency of the country that has the highest import from OPEC. 
  
Figure 2: Exchange Rate Markets 
 
 
  
Figure 2 compares the exchange rates of the euro and the dollar from 1986 to 2002. The 
Japanese yen was chosen as the reference currency because of its prominence as a major 
currency in the world financial markets, and because it is the next major trading partner 
to OPEC, following the European Union and the United States. JPY/EUR and JPY/USD 
exchange rates were retrieved from DataStream. One can see that the JPY/EUR exchange 
rate is more volatile than the JPY/USD rate. Table 1 (in the Appendix) computes the 
volatility of the two exchange rates and the JPY/EUR rate can be observed that is about 
63 percent more volatile than JPY/USD rate in the time from 1986 to 2002. To find the 
correlation between the three currency movements in euro, dollar and yen were obtained 
from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003 and compared from the year 1986 to 
2002 (table 2). Yen pricing is correlated more with the dollar pricing (r=0.87) than that of 
the euro pricing (r=0.78).  
Although from this analysis euro pricing appears to be more volatile and unsuitable 
against a Japanese yen reference, it should be borne in mind that our calculations are 
based on synthetic euro rates. Further, euro is a comparatively new currency and its 
stability is yet to be proved. 
  
 Figure 3: Oil Exports from OPEC Members 1981-2003 
0.0% 
20.0% 
40.0% 
60.0% 
80.0% 
100.0% 
120.0% 
ALGERIA INDONESIA IRAN IRAQ KUWAIT LIBIYA NIGERIA QATAR SAUDI 
ARABIA UAE VENEZUELA OPEC
EXPORTS FROM
USA EXPORTS EU EXPORTS
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Oil exports data was acquired from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2002. Table 5 
compares the oil exports of all the OPEC members to the other major countries, namely, 
United States, European Union, Japan, and the rest of the world. Wide disparity is 
observed for exports of each OPEC member to other countries. Between 1998 and 2002 
only two (Nigeria and Venezuela) of the eleven countries exported more oil to the United 
States than to the European Union. Nigeria exported about 17 percent more and 
Venezuela exported about 53 percent more oil to the United States than to the European 
Union. Alternatively, three countries (Algeria, Libya and Iran) exported 55 percent, 97 
percent, and 36 percent, respectively, more oil to the European Union than to the United 
States. Four countries (Indonesia, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE) exported more oil to Japan 
and averaged approximately 31 percent, 36 percent, 68 percent, and 61 percent 
respectively. However, their exports to the United States and the European Union were 
comparatively small (an average of about 8 percent, 19 percent, 0.5 percent, and 0.5 
percent to the United States, and 0 percent, 13.5 percent, 0.4 percent and 0.3 percent to 
the European Union, respectively). Although the individual figures show wide 
discrepancies, for OPEC the bulk of oil exports averaged only 2 percent more to the 
European Union than to the United States, which shows that the net exports to the United 
States and European Union are not significantly different.  
Regarding this circumstance, the issue that one addresses is whether the revenue from oil 
exports to United States and European Union adequately compensates for the goods and 
service imports from these regions respectively. If OPEC countries import a major share 
of their needs from the United States, then the dollar revenues from oil export could be 
employed to pay for these imports. On the contrary, if a majority of OPEC's imports 
originates from non-dollar areas, then the dollar revenues need to convert to pay for the 
imports. As the value of the dollar is subject to uncertainty, the purchasing power of the 
dollar revenues also becomes unstable. In accordance with this argument, Verleger 
(2003) states that even in the case of a stable nominal price, a decrease in the dollar value 
would worsen the situation for OPEC because it buys a large share of its goods and 
services from non-United States suppliers that deal in euros or yen. 
From the viewpoint of member states within OPEC, Houghton (1991) analyzed the 
impact of the decline in the value of the dollar on the purchasing power for the time 1986 
to 1991. He argues that the declining dollar was not a factor in the reduction in 
purchasing power of OPEC revenues because prices reflect demand and supply and 
therefore tend to equilibrium after a time lag. However, in this adjustment process, he 
states when the dollar appreciates, "OPEC states that spend almost all their revenues on 
United States goods will be better off" and those that spend their revenues outside of 
dollar trading zones will be worse off. Hence, in the event of a mismatch between the 
dollar revenues and dollar denominated import expenditures, the problem of currency 
exposure arises leading to a loss for some members.  
Therefore, the choice of currency used for pricing oil depends largely on the nature of the 
imports of OPEC. To find OPEC's import patterns, Table 6 was constructed using the 
average of import of OPEC from USA, European Union, Japan and the rest of the world 
obtained from DataStream in the time 1981 to 2002. From Table 6, it is seen that only 
Venezuela has a major share of its imports from the United States at an average of 42.3 
percent (1981 - 2002), while all the other OPEC members import a major share of goods 
and services from the European Union. For OPEC taken as a whole, 37 percent of the 
imports originate from the European Union and only about 14 percent of the imports 
originate from the United States. This mismatch in the trade directions exposes OPEC to 
currency risk, which leads to wealth disruptions by way of currency exposure.  
Figure 4: A System Dynamics model of Exchange Rate Impact on OPEC's Trade 
 
 
Figure 4 presents a system dynamics model to simulate in a non-linear fashion, the effect 
of exchange rate on the trade balance of OPEC members. Trade balance is represented as 
the net of total exports and total imports. This simulation model helps in understanding 
the role of exchange rate in the import of goods and services and export revenues.  
A review of finance literature provides that the net of a corporation's foreign currency 
assets and foreign currency liabilities constitutes its currency exposure. This, when 
multiplied with the change in the exchange rate, measures the real gain/loss related to 
currency exposure (Knortz, 1978).  
Figure 5: Imports of Goods from United States and European Union (1981 - 2002) 
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We extend this definition of exposure to OPEC, where the exports and imports are 
unequal. For simplicity, we consider the case of one member country trading with only 
two partners, European Union and United States. If  and   represent the oil 
exported to the United States and European Union respectively, then the foreign currency 
revenue to the exporting country can be expressed as [ + ]. If  and  
represent the goods imported from United States and European Union respectively then 
the currency exposure for the OPEC countries under dollar pricing of crude oil is derived 
as follows:  
US
OX
X
EU
OX
EU
OX
US
O
US
gM EUgM
 Currency Exposure = Foreign currency revenue – Foreign currency expense 
= [  + ]                                    (1) USOX −EUOX USgM
We first considered the existing scenario where the oil is priced in United States dollar. If 
)( US
LC
rδ  represents the change in the exchange rate (exporting country’s local 
currency/United States dollar) then the actual loss related to currency exposure for the 
exporting country in its local currency is given as  
Actual Loss = [ + ]* USOX −EUOX USgM )( US
LC
rδ                      (2.a) 
Alternatively, when the oil is priced in euros, the actual loss to the OPEC country in 
terms of its local currency is 
Actual Loss = [ + ]* USOX −EUOX EUgM )( EU
LC
rδ                 (2.b) 
where )( EU
LC
rδ represents the change in the exchange rate (exporting country’s local 
currency/euro). It is necessary to choose that currency such that the loss due to currency 
exposure is minimized, that is, 
Min {([ + ]*USOX −EUOX
US
gM )( US
LC
rδ ), ([ + ]*USOX −EUOX EUgM )( EU
LC
rδ )} 
Using the above equation, Table 4 computes the loss due to currency exposure under the 
alternatives of dollar and euro pricing. It can be seen that when priced in dollars the loss 
for OPEC as a whole is 88.3 percent of the total exports for the year 2002, which is about 
28 percent in excess of the condition when oil is priced in euros. The figures are also 
averaged from 1981 to 2002, and the argument still holds in favor of pricing in euros, as 
the exposure loss is 89.8 percent of total exports under dollar pricing, which is about 17 
percent in excess of euro pricing. 
III. Alternatives Raised at OPEC 
To compensate for the volatility of oil revenue caused by the import-export mismatch, 
OPEC discussed various alternatives. In all of the agreements, the aim was to use a 
basket of currencies representative of the traditional hard currencies, such as the dollar, 
mark, sterling, yen, Swiss and French francs (Seymour, 1980). 
In January 1972, the first alternative that was agreed upon was to adjust the price of oil 
proportionate to the plunge in the value of dollar according to the price of gold. This was 
named Geneva I according to which future postings were to be adjusted in line with an 
index based on the movement of nine major industrialized countries' currencies [3]. The 
difficulty arose in the uncertainty of the movement of the dollar in the future. As a result, 
they made the Geneva II (June 1973) agreement. This led to the revision of the 
adjustment formula to make it more responsive to the future exchange rate movements, 
including monthly rather than quarterly adjustments. Eleven currencies were used this 
time, which included two additional currencies - the Canadian and the Australian dollar. 
However, after the October 1973 price debacle, the Geneva adjustments were abandoned 
entirely. 
A third alternative, discussed in June 1975, was the use of the International Monetary 
Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) in place of the United States dollar. The SDR was 
originally designed with 16 currencies in 1974, but in 1981 it consisted of only five 
currencies: the U.S. dollar, German mark, French franc, Japanese yen and United 
Kingdom pound sterling. The weight of each country's currency was based on its share of 
world trade. The problem with using the SDR was at times when the SDR depreciated 
against the dollar, OPEC members would suffer loss [4]. Various modifications of the 
SDR were suggested: to use an asymmetrical SDR to reflect only the appreciation of the 
underlying currency, the establishment of a safety net for the SDR to offset the future 
depreciation of the SDR against the United States dollar, and the usage of the SDR as a 
medium of exchange between OPEC and its trading nations. However, using SDR would 
lead to unwanted financial transactions, as trading partners rush to acquire the currencies 
of the underlying SDR. In any case, all of the suggestions would lead to a significant 
supply of United States dollars in the market and a loss of confidence in the United States 
dollar, which would have undesirable impacts on the world economy. Moreover, "to the 
extent the major trading partners follow widely divergent growth, employment, price 
system, and budgetary policies at home. any fixed exchange rate system would be 
subject to violent twists and turns. With no firm commitment on the part of the 
industrial countries to coordinate their employment and price policies, a return to a 
system of 'fixed but adjustable' par values would be impractical." and the strategy of 
OPEC shifting to SDR was not exactly the best alternative (Amuzenager, 1978). 
In recent times, the euro has become a major currency since it was created. A series of 
factors contribute towards promoting the use of the euro as an international currency. The 
first factor is the grand scale of the economy in the region, which represents 16 percent of 
world GDP, constituting the second highest GDP in the world, next to the GDP of United 
States, which represents 21 percent of the world GDP. The second factor is the sound 
foundation of the economy of the euro zone. The third factor is the integration of national 
financial markets in Europe, leading to the creation of financial markets of high liquidity 
(Sakkoulidis, 2003). Therefore, with the current emergence of the euro, because of strict 
coordination from the participating members in terms of their economic and monetary 
policies, it is, to an extent, a representative of a currency that was envisioned in the 1980 
debate. Hence, the euro could be considered a suitable alternative compared to Geneva I, 
Geneva II, and SDR for pricing oil. 
Another rational option is the multiple pricing of oil in the different currencies of the 
trading partners. The current strategy of pricing oil in a single currency that is foreign to 
OPEC and some of its trading partners carries an unnecessary element of currency 
exposure for both players involved. Hence, a shift to a strategy whereby every country 
uses its own local currency to trade with OPEC seems ideal as it would eliminate the 
currency risk for the oil importers. However, this would necessitate that oil be priced in 
different currencies. The major drawback of this proposal lies in the fact that purchasing 
power parity does not always hold true in the currency markets and this disequilibrium in 
the currency market would translate to potential arbitrage in the oil market. 
Winners and Losers 
A carefully structured policy in pursuit of the betterment of all members is the goal of 
OPEC, however what is good for the organization as a whole may not be beneficial to the 
individual members; winners and losers emerge within the organization. The currency 
alternative in oil pricing facing OPEC must be analyzed along the following dimensions: 
a) Collectively from OPEC's perspective and b) from the individual country's perspective 
to satisfy Pareto optimality condition.  
Evaluating from OPEC's perspective, losses due to currency exposure can be minimized 
by pricing in euro because, as explained earlier, oil exports to the European Union is 1.8 
percent in excess of exports to the United States and goods imported from the European 
Union is 23.6 percent in excess of imports originating from the United States. 
Consequently, this reduces the value of the oil revenues exposed to the fluctuations in the 
exchange rate and economic losses are minimized. Other things held constant, Table 4 
shows that the average currency exposure could have been reduced by 17.7 percent if oil 
were priced in euros between 1986 and 2002. 
Looking at the scenario from the individual member's perspective, one can see that 
Venezuela would be negatively affected if oil were priced in euros. This is because 
Venezuela's major trading partner is the United States, with 58.5 percent oil exports and 
only 5.1 percent flows to the European Union. While 42.3 percent of imports originate 
from the United States, only 23.1 percent of imports originate from the European Union. 
Therefore, pricing in dollars would expose a huge share of its oil revenues to fluctuations 
in euros and, therefore, it is inferred that the euro pricing would be detrimental to 
Venezuela. 
Another equally important factor that is identified, but beyond the scope of the discussion 
of this paper, is the impact of fluctuations on the dollar and dollar denominated assets and 
liabilities that is largely held by OPEC members. In addition, the impact of fluctuations 
and implications of a shift to the euro on oil importers and financial markets are 
recognized as a probe for further research. 
Finally, the scope of this research did not include those countries whose currencies are 
pegged to the dollar and the euro. This study has not identified the weight of dollar and 
euro in the overall global trade. 
IX. Conclusion 
The emergence and rise of the euro as a prominent trading currency has offered an 
opportunity for OPEC to reconsider pricing of its crude oil in the new currency. The main 
consideration in making such a policy change by the oil exporters is the ability to 
maintain their purchasing power of a barrel of their oil exports in an era of persistent 
dollar decline and to avoid uncertainty regarding their oil revenues in real terms. 
While the majority of oil exporting countries trade with non-dollar areas, particularly 
with European countries, switching to euro - based oil prices seems to be a realistic 
possibility. However, for countries such as Venezuela, which trades mainly with the 
United States, this strategy would be counterproductive. Therefore, such a shift in 
strategy would not be Pareto optimal and would result in disadvantage for the countries 
having United States as a major trading partner. 
Moreover, such a policy would seem impossible to implement given the political 
dynamics and the governance of OPEC. Within OPEC, any decision taken by the 
ministerial conference has to be agreed upon unanimously. The fact that there will be 
losers in such a policy shift would imply that these countries would categorically not 
support such a decision and therefore status quo will remain. 
 
 
**Authors are with the Southern New Hampshire University, International Business 
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Endnotes: 
1. The OPEC's Long Term Strategy Committee was chaired by Sheikh Zaki Yamani, Oil 
minister of Saudi Arabia and met on a number of occasions, including May 6 and 7, 1978 
at Taif, Saudi Arabia. 
2. Synthetic euro exchange rate is obtained from the DataStream service and has been 
calculated by FTSE International Ltd against various other currencies. Calculations are 
based on the deutsche/euro irrevocable fixed conversion rate of 1.95583, the cross-rates 
to the deutsche mark as published on May 4, 1998 and the weighting factor used is a 
constant (1996 GDP weight of each country). 
3. The nine currencies were Belgian, Swiss and French francs, German mark, Italian lira, 
Japanese yen, Dutch guilder, Swedish krone and the pound sterling. 
4. The decline in the value of the dollar with respect to other currencies gradually altered 
the SDR value of the dollar. In the early November 1978, the value of the dollar was only 
78 percent of that of the SDR. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Volatility and Exchange rate 
  
Year JPY/USD JPY/EUR 
1986 161.8 152.2
1987 134.8 155.2
1988 122.2 168.2
1989 143.4 176.8
1990 130.0 166.7
1991 130.0 189.0
1992 124.5 175.6
1993 108.8 135.8
1994 98.6 111.0
1995 101.3 125.7
1996 113.3 150.8
1997 127.8 162.5
1998 123.0 134.2
1999 101.7 119.5
2000 110.2 111.8
2001 123.1 115.6
2002 122.2 108.8
Table 2:Oil prices in USD, EUR, JPY 
 
YEAR USD EURO JPM 
1986 14.38 15.29 2327.99 
1987 18.42 16.01 2461.91 
1988 14.96 10.87 1826.62 
1989 18.20 14.76 2611.57 
1990 23.84 18.58 3092.77 
1991 20.05 13.79 2602.80 
1992 19.37 13.73 2410.44 
1993 17.07 13.67 1854.35 
1994 15.98 14.20 1574.88 
1995 17.18 13.84 1740.04 
1996 20.80 15.63 2364.15 
1997 19.30 15.18 2463.43 
1998 13.11 12.02 1612.85 
1999 18.25 15.54 1863.07 
2000 28.98 28.55 3191.72 
2001 24.77 26.38 3053.70 
2002 25.19 28.29 3075.96  
σ 16.1 26.3 
 
Table 3: Correlations of Oil Prices 
  USD EUR JPY 
USD 1 0.88 0.87 
EUR  1.00 0.78 
JPY     1.00  
 
Table 4: Currency Exposure 
PRICING USD EURO 
2002 142098.6 97271.4 
 88.3% 60.4% 
e(x) 156998.9 125970.3 
  89.8% 72.1%  
Source: DataStream and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003 
 
 
Table 5: OPEC Oil Exports 
OIL EXPORTS OF OPEC 1998 – 2002 
COUNTRIES USA EU JAPAN WORLD 
ALGERIA     
2002 254.7 2337.2  3652.9 
 7.00% 64.00%  100.00% 
e(x) 421.9 2679.8  4067 
 10.40% 65.90%  100.00% 
Σ 570.6 629.8  936.3 
INDONESIA     
2002 433.1  1363.5 5607.6 
 7.70%  24.30% 100.00% 
e(x) 464.2  1781.5 5810.4 
 8.00%  30.70% 100.00% 
Σ 101.5  320.6 578.1 
IRAN     
2002  5706 4877.6 19249.3 
  29.60% 25.30% 100.00% 
e(x)  7600.8 4491.5 20743.8 
  36.60% 21.70% 100.00% 
Σ  1883.4 747 4194.5 
IRAQ     
2002 8059.8 3809.2 115.8 13741.9 
 58.70% 27.70% 0.80% 100.00% 
e(x) 6175.6 5602 347.8 15601.7 
 39.60% 35.90% 2.20% 100.00% 
Σ 2042.5 1981.8 333.4 3455 
KUWAIT     
2002 1985.1 1092.3 4806.8 10463.2 
 19.00% 10.40% 45.90% 100.00% 
e(x) 2014.3 1399.4 3723.8 10343.4 
 19.50% 13.50% 36.00% 100.00% 
Σ 644.9 517.7 922.9 2457 
LIBIYA     
2002  8024.8  8480.9 
  94.60%  100.00% 
e(x)  8772.9  9064.2 
  96.80%  100.00% 
Σ  1696.9  1691.8 
NIGERIA     
2002 5340.1 3790.8 726.4 16533.3 
 32.30% 22.90% 4.40% 100.00% 
e(x) 6881.6 4062.3 252.5 16928.9 
 40.60% 24.00% 1.50% 100.00% 
σ 2058.5 818.6 266 3595.5 
QATAR     
2002 81.8 13.8 4089.6 5340.1 
 1.50% 0.30% 76.60% 100.00% 
e(x) 25.6 21.2 3579.1 5295.4 
 0.50% 0.40% 67.60% 100.00% 
σ 37.7 10.4 657.3 949.6 
SAUDI ARABIA     
2002 11811.1 8265.7 8367.8 48588.5 
 24.30% 17.00% 17.20% 100.00% 
e(x) 12737 11095.6 6957.9 53231.7 
 23.90% 20.80% 13.10% 100.00% 
σ 2461.9 3361.5 2641.5 10601.1 
UAE     
2002 91.9 27.6 10875.1 14839.7 
 0.60% 0.20% 73.30% 100.00% 
e(x) 76.5 44.5 10020.1 16344.2 
 0.50% 0.30% 61.30% 100.00% 
σ 75.7 45.8 1685.5 2687.9 
VENEZUELA     
2002 8020.2 962.6  14453.5 
 55.50% 6.70%  100.00% 
e(x) 10211.1 890.1  17369.9 
 58.80% 5.10%  100.00% 
σ 2512.4 163.4  3698.1 
OPEC     
2002 36077.7 34030.1 35222.6 160950.8 
 22.40% 21.10% 21.90% 100.00% 
e(x) 38902.9 42155.9 31154.2 174800.8 
 22.30% 24.10% 17.80% 100.00% 
σ 7464 9962.7 5877 32684.4 
Source: DataStream and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 
